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Auditing for Fraud: Perception vs. Reality

Alan J. Winters

American Institute of CPAs

John B. Sullivan
Deloitte & Touche*

When you come to a fork in the road, take it.
Yogi Berra
Many people, both in and out of the accounting profession, would say that Mr.
Berra's aphorism has guided the evolution of the auditor's responsibility to detect
fraud. Throughout its history, the profession has taken various positions on this
responsibility; sometimes adopting a position, abandoning it, and then returning to it.
This erratic evolution has been propelled largely by two factors. One factor is the
vagaries of auditors' beliefs about (1) what degree of fraud detection responsibility is
commensurate with an auditor's professional obligation and (2) what technical
prowess auditors command to detect fraud. The other factor is what responsibility the
public, in the form of users of the auditor's product; regulators and legislators; courts;
and financial press writers, expect auditors to assume.
This paper begins with a summarized history of the evolution of the auditor's
responsibility to detect fraud in financial statement audits, including both nonauthoritative and authoritative guidance and major influences outside the profession. We then
provide a critique of the effectiveness of audit approaches for detecting fraud. Finally,
we offer some suggestions for modifying those approaches and improving their effectiveness.

Progression of Professional GuidanceNonauthoritative and Authoritative

From ancient times until around the turn of the twentieth century, auditing's
primary objective was to detect fraud and the technique used was detailed examination rather than selective testing (Brown 1962). For example, the prevention and
detection of fraud underlay the "hearing" of accounts during the Roman Empire as
well as audits of companies during the Industrial Revolution (Brown 1962).
During the five years that preceded and followed the turn of the twentieth century,
the primary objective of auditing began to shift. Contrasting passages from two prominent auditing texts issued seven years apart illustrate this shift.
"The object of an audit may be said to be three-fold:
1. The detection of fraud.
2. The detection of technical errors.
3. The detection of errors of principle." (Dicksee 1905)
* The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the AICPA or
Deloitte & Touche.
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"In what might be called the formative days of auditing, students were taught that
the chief objects of an audit were:
1. Detection and prevention of fraud.
2. Detection and prevention of errors, but in recent years there has been a decided
change in demand and service.
Present-day purposes are:
1. To ascertain actual financial condition and earning of an enterprise.
2. Detection of fraud and errors, but this is a minor objective." (Montgomery
1912)
In addition to the shift in audit objective, there was a move away from detailed
examination of virtually every transaction toward selective testing. This change
occurred because of the growing size of audited entities and the accompanying
impracticability of detailed verification. Also, auditors began to recognize internal
control and its relationship to testing and also to develop audit sampling techniques.
Thus, both the objective of audits and the techniques used to perform them transformed.
The transition in the practicing profession's stance on the auditor's responsibility
for detecting fraud continued until the first authoritative recognition of this responsibility in 1951 in Codification of Statements on Auditing Procedure (AICPA 1951).
Codification of Statements on Auditing Procedure: The Codification stated that
an audit is not designed and cannot be relied on to disclose fraud. It emphasized that
primary responsibility for detecting fraud lies with adequate systems of accounting
and internal control. It also indicated that if the auditor becomes suspicious of the
client's integrity, he or she must extend audit procedures to determine whether those
suspicions are justified.
In 1961, SAP No. 30, Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor in
the Examination of Financial Statements (AICPA 1961), set forth the auditor's responsibilities for fraud detection in substantial detail. That SAP, as codified in SAP No. 33,
contained the following guidance:
•
•
•

•

•
•
•

In an audit, the auditor is aware that fraud may exist.
The auditor recognizes that, if a fraud is sufficiently material, it may affect the
opinion and considers this possibility.
A n audit is not designed and cannot be relied on to disclose defalcations or
misrepresentations by management; failure to detect fraud is only a problem
insofar as it results from the failure to comply with G A A S .
Detecting fraud is the responsibility of the accounting system and system of
internal accounting control; the auditor evaluates the system of internal
accounting control to determine the selection and timing of other auditing
procedures.
The cost of searching for fraud would be prohibitive and the exercise would, in
some cases, be futile.
If the auditor suspects fraud, he or she needs to determine the possible magnitude.
If the magnitude is likely to be material, the auditor should reach an understanding with the client as to who w i l l investigate it and determine its
magnitude.
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•

If the magnitude is not likely to be material, the auditor should refer it to the
proper representatives of the client with the suggestion that they follow up.
• Subsequent discovery of fraud does not necessarily indicate substandard audit
work; the auditor has fulfilled his or her responsibility i f the audit was
performed with due care and skill in accordance with G A A S .
This discussion was carried forward to SAS No. 1, section 110.05-.08.
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 16: In the early to mid 1970's, the
Auditing Standards Executive Committee (AudSEC) reconsidered the auditor's
responsibility to detect fraud. This reconsideration was spurred by, among other
things, the report of the AICPA's Special Committee on Equity Funding and the
growing recognition that the public considered fraud detection an important objective
of an audit. A s a result, AudSEC, in 1977, issued SAS No. 16, The Independent
Auditor's Responsibility for the Detection of Errors or Irregularities (AICPA 1977).
SAS No. 16 made the following changes to authoritative literature:
•
•

Expanded guidance to address errors in addition to irregularities.
Added the concept that financial statement users look to internal control
together with audits to provide assurance about the financial statements.
• Restated the auditor's responsibility affirmatively; that is, rather than state what
the auditor is not responsible for, state what the auditor is responsible for−to
plan the audit to search for material errors and irregularities.
• Added the concept of professional skepticism
• Added a discussion of the interrelationship of controls and errors and irregulari
ties, compliance testing (reliance) and substantive testing (from SAS No. 1,
section 320).
• Included warning signals-circumstances suggesting the potential for errors or
irregularities.
• Added discussions of the importance of management integrity and warning
signals suggesting potential for management misrepresentation, but not that,
absent information to the contrary, the auditor may assume no misrepresenta
tions (or overriding of controls) has occurred.
• Strengthened the discussion of the inherent limitations of an audit and stated
that, no matter how much work the auditor does, he or she will fail to detect
some types of irregularities or misrepresentations.
• Made more specific the auditor's obligations and procedures when the auditor
suspects material errors or irregularities. Whereas S A P No. 30 only required
that the auditor reach an understanding with the client as to who will investigate
them, SAS No. 16 specified the level of management to be contacted, require
ments to obtain evidential matter, implications for the auditor's report, and
further actions.
• Specified to whom the auditor should report immaterial errors or irregularities
and stated that the auditor should consider their effect on other facets of the
audit.
SEC Reaction to SAS No. 16: A l l of the SEC's comments on the exposure draft of
SAS No. 16 were incorporated in the final standard except one. The SEC believed "it
would be useful to include a comment to the effect that many errors and irregularities
will be discovered by an auditor standing back from the detail and considering an
enterprise, its environment, and its financial statements in the overall." Although that
guidance was not specifically incorporated in SAS No. 16, SAS No. 23, Analytical
Review Procedures, noted that analytical procedures may be performed at or near the
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conclusion of the engagement as an overall review of financial information.
Subsequently, SAS No. 56, Analytical Procedures, removed the option and required
that analytical procedures be used in the overall review of the financial statements in
the final review stage of the audit.
Cohen Commission: In 1978, the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities:
Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations, (Cohen Commission 1978) was
published−about a year after SAS No. 16. The report made a number of recommenda
tions regarding the auditor's responsibilities to detect fraud:
•

Provide explicit guidance on the appropriate exercise of professional skill and
care concerning fraud detection. For example, if an audit is conducted with due
care, the auditor will discover certain types of irregularities, should they exist. A
reasonable search for irregularities is necessary to provide an important service.
A standard of professional skill and care is needed to evaluate the performance
of auditors.
• Require periodic review of existing clients for determination as to continuance.
If there is any doubt about management integrity, the auditor should take all
reasonable actions to resolve the doubt because, if management is not trust
worthy, there is a significant likelihood that an audit cannot be performed. (SAS
No. 7 requires investigation when taking on a new client. There are no G A A S
requirements concerning existing clients. Quality Control Standard No. 1
requires consideration of policies regarding continuance of clients.)
• Require auditors to study and evaluate internal controls that have a significant
bearing on the prevention and detection of fraud.
• Form a special A I C P A to analyze fraud cases and advice on their effect on
auditing standards.
Subcommittee on Fraud: The Standing Subcommittee on Methods of
Perpetration and Detection of Fraud was charged to study and publish analyses of
fraud cases to consider how such cases affect the need for revised or new auditing
standards. The subcommittee was created as a result of the Cohen Commission
recommendation discussed in the previous section. Although the subcommittee accu
mulated a large data base of reported cases, its only tangible product was a list of 16
warning signals of fraud, which was published in the May 12, 1979 CPA Letter. In
addition, the subcommittee advised other AICPA components, for example the C P E
division, on projects involving fraud and it reviewed the research that was eventually
published as the Report of the Study of EDP-Related Fraud in the Banking and
Insurance Industries.
The subcommittee disbanded in 1981 due, in large part, to its inability to obtain
specific information from CPA firms regarding frauds detected. When the AICPA's
Special Investigations Committee was established, it had the ability to obtain that
information more effectively than the subcommittee and the latter was deemed un
necessary.
SAS No. 53, The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and
Irregularities: During the early 1980's, several events occurred that prompted the
Auditing Standards Board ( A S B ) to reconsider its authoritative position on the
auditor's responsibility to detect fraud and on related technical guidance. The two
predominant events were a number of well-publicized business failures and the
Dingell hearings, which were kindled by those failures as well. These events caused
the profession to question whether it had accepted sufficient responsibility to find
fraud and whether it had been effective enough in uncovering it.
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The ASB's response to these questions was SAS No. 53 (AICPA 1988). That SAS
expanded the auditor's responsibility to detect fraud. In simple terms, the S A S
elevated this responsibility by changing it from one of looking for fraud to one of
detecting it. In the more precise language of the standards, SAS No. 16 required the
auditor to plan the audit to search forfraud,while SAS No. 53 requires the auditor to
provide reasonable assurance of detecting it.
The overall tone of the two standards also differs. S A S N o . 53 couches the
auditor's responsibility in a much more affirmative manner than SAS No. 16 by deemphasizing the inherent limitations of an audit. It also discarded the SAS No. 16 notion
that auditors could assume management was honest unless there was information to
the contrary. It replaced this notion with a requirement that the auditor make a
specific assessment of the risk of management misrepresentations-assuming neither
management's honesty nor dishonesty.
SAS No. 53 also provided much more specific guidance about the effect of fraud
on auditors' reports and on their communications both within and outside the entity. In
addition, SAS No. 53 strengthened the guidance about planning and performing the
audit and evaluating audit results. Because these latter requirements are discussed
extensively in the another section of this paper, they are not detailed here.
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting: The National
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (National 1987) was a private sector
initiative jointly sponsored by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
American Accounting Association, Financial Executives Institute, Institute of Internal
Auditors, and Institute of Management Accountants. Its objective was to identify the
incidence, causes, and potential remedies relative to fraudulent financial reporting and
consider the roles of relevant bodies, including independent auditors, entity management and employees, educators, and regulatory and enforcement agencies.
The Treadway Commission was formed in large part as a response to public
concerns, including those of legislators, about business failures in which fraudulent
financial reporting was believed to be involved. The Commission performed a large
part of its work concurrently with the development of SAS No. 53, and, as a result, the
SAS incorporated to some extent most of the Commission's recommendations as they
related to the independent auditors' detection of fraud. These recommendations were:
•

Restate the auditor's responsibility for detecting fraud to require reasonable
assurance that it is detected.
• Provide guidance to improve the auditor's ability to detect fraud.
• Strengthen the quality of audit management.
• Improve communications with users about the nature, scope, and limitations of
an audit.
Public Oversight Board: The Public Oversight Board (POB) is the most recent of
the profession's bodies to issue recommendations concerning the auditor's responsibility to detect fraud. In a 1993 report (POB 1993), the POB said "...to a greater
extent than it now does, the profession must accept responsibility for the detection of
fraud by management." To that end, the POB made the following specific recommendations:
•

The profession should develop a process to analyze alleged audit failures to
determine their causes and to develop enhanced risk assessment and procedural
guidance.
• The profession should strengthen its emphasis on professional skepticism.
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Other Recent Initiatives: Recent actions concerning the auditor's responsibility to
detect fraud confirms that its evolution is continuing−that concern and confusion
about the nature and adequacy of the guidance in SAS No. 53 remains. In May 1992,
the AICPA held an Expectations Gap Conference to assess the progress of the nine
expectation gap standards issued in 1988. The discussion of SAS No. 53 during that
roundtable (Albrecht and Willingham 1992) indicated that SAS No. 53 may not be
adequately addressing fraud detection.
The AICPA's Board of Directors issued a report in 1993 (AICPA 1993) stating that
"The public looks to the independent auditor to detect fraud, and it is the auditor's
responsibility to do so." This statement was intended not only as a response to
lingering public concerns about auditors' detection responsibility, but also as a
reminder to the profession about what its responsibility is. That report also supported
the POB's recommendations pertaining to fraud detection, cited above, and pledged
action to implement them.
In a related step, the January, 1994 CPA Letter, contained a discussion of fraud be
cause "it is clear that some members are still confused about their responsibility−and
some commentators have objected to the position of the AICPA Board of Directors on
the matter."
As a culmination to continuing skepticism about SAS No. 53, the A S B recently
appointed a fraud task force to reexamine that SAS and determine whether it should
be revised or supplemented.

Influences Outside the Accounting Profession
A number of groups outside the accounting profession have influenced profes
sional guidance pertaining to the auditor's responsibility to detect fraud. They include
audit report users, legislators and regulators, the courts, and the financial press. These
groups have often interacted with each other, one group fueling the concerns of others.
Almost without exception, the concerns and actions of these groups were triggered by
financial losses suffered by investors and creditors that, at least in part, were blamed
on fraudulent financial reporting and failed audits.
Initiatives from these groups have taken a wide variety of forms including investi
gations by three Congressional subcommittees, proposed legislation, legal decisions,
and op ed pieces in prominent financial and business publications. Although a review
of these initiatives is far beyond the scope of this paper, their collective effect demon
strates the public perception that auditors should detect fraud.
Actions by these groups have, indeed, influenced the profession's consideration of
its fraud detection responsibility. The timing of the Moss (1976) and Metcalf (1977)
hearings and the issuance of SAS No. 16 in 1977 was not coincidental. Neither were
the Dingell hearings in the mid 1980's, the Treadway Commission deliberations of
that same period, and the issuance of SAS No. 53 in 1988 random events. The public
has influenced the evolution of the auditor's responsibility to detect fraud, and it
continues to.

The Risk Model and Fraud Detection
S A S N o . 53, The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and
Irregularities, employs the audit risk model to frame the auditor's responsibility to
detect fraud. The auditor is required to assess the risk that errors and irregularities may
cause the financial statements to contain a material misstatement. The SAS requires
the auditor to consider factors that influence this risk (hereafter referred to as fraud
risk factors). It provides examples of these factors that the auditor may consider that
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pertain to both the financial statement level (all or several financial statement compo
nents) and the account balance or transaction class level (individual financial
statement components).
The Theory of Fraud Risk Factors
The fundamental theory underlying fraud risk factors (also referred to as red flags,
indicators, characteristics) is that their presence may portend an increased likelihood
of fraud induced misstatements in the financial statements. This theory underlies the
risk model approach set forth in SAS 53.
A respectable amount of research, both in academia and professional practice, has
been devoted to the theory and application of fraud risk factors (for example,
Albrecht, et al 1980; Albrecht and Romney 1986; Albrecht and Willingham 1992;
Campbell and Parker 1992; Loebbecke et. al. 1989; National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1987; Pincus 1989). Research efforts directed toward
this theory have addressed various aspects of fraud risk factors including identifying
them, classifying them, weighting them, combining them, and testing their predictive
effectiveness.
The bulk of research, practice experience, and anecdotal history indicates that fraud
risk factors−those in SAS No. 53, as well as other combinations−are undependable as
cues for fraud induced misstatements. This body of evidence challenges the adequacy
of the guidance in SAS No. 53 and strongly suggests that additional or, perhaps, alter
native guidance should be developed.
Limitations of Fraud Risk Factors
A number of attributes limit the reliability of fraud risk factors, and therefore the
audit risk model, in predicting fraud induced misstatements. The following discussion
briefly describes what we believe to be the most significant limiting attributes.
Recognition and consideration of these attributes potentially can aid in improving
audit guidance for fraud detection.
Inappropriate Risk Factors: Several research studies have addressed the question
of which fraud risk factors are most effective in predicting fraud induced misstate
ments (for example, Albrecht and Willingham 1992; Loebbecke et al 1989; and Pincus
1989). Most of these studies have concluded that S A S No. 53 contains some risk
factors that are not effective predictors and excludes some factors that are. Research,
however, has not yet constructed a set of risk factors with sufficient predictive ability
to correctly categorize frauds and nonfrauds in an audit. Therefore, auditors applying
No. SAS No. 53 are faced with a relatively long list of risk factors with varying
degrees of predictive success, many of which are always present in an audit client. As
a result, we believe, many auditors doubt the credibility of fraud risk factors in
detecting fraud.
Further, some auditors have expressed concern that a requirement to consider
imprecise fraud risk factors raises their exposure to litigation substantially more than
it increases their likelihood of detecting fraud. In their view, this added legal risk
arises when they have dutifully considered risk factors, responded with appropriate
audit modifications, not detected fraud induced misstatements, and, after issuing an
unqualified opinion, fraud is discovered.
Combining and Weighting Risk Factors: In addition to the issue of which risk
factors are accurate indicators of fraud, the question also exists as to how to combine
or categorize these factors and what relative weights to assign them. SAS No. 53
states that the factors should be combined, but provides no related guidance. Some
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research has delved into the combination issue by creating classes or categories of
factors, such as situational, opportunity, and personal honesty (Albrecht et al 1980)
and conditions, motivation, and attitude (Loebbecke et al 1989). However, these
research results have not been refined and tested sufficiently to demonstrate their
effectiveness as fraud predictors.
Even i f relevant fraud risk factors can be identified, their application is limited by
the auditor's lack of knowledge about their relative significance in diagnosing fraud
induced misstatements. The only study we are aware of that addressed "weighting"
risk factors is Albrecht and Willingham, 1992, which used statistical models to eval
uate weightings. That study concluded that "The weight that should be assigned to
each relevant fraud indicator in combining them is a very complex problem. Based on
research results, guidance about combination of fraud indicators is beyond the ca
pability of an S A S . . . . [W]hile the models are somewhat accurate at both the very low
and very high risk levels, they are significantly less accurate when the risk is deter
mined to be low, moderate, and high. In every risk case, misinterpretations about
whether fraud existed were present."
Some public accounting firms avoid the issue of combining risk factors by requiring
a response to any risk factor present. In essence, this approach requires the auditor to
consider whether "other conditions" might offset or augment the likelihood of fraud.
We believe the practical problems of combining and weighting fraud risk factors is
a significant limitation of the utility of the risk model approach in SAS 53. We hope
that future research will address these problems and help alleviate them.
Inability to Target Specific Misstatements: Fraud risk factors, those in SAS No.
53 and others, are intended to predict the presence of fraud. If and when a set of rele
vant, properly combined and weighted risk factors is developed, it can, at best, only
accurately predict that fraud has occurred. These factors cannot direct the auditor to
financial statement components where fraud induced misstatements exist. SAS No. 53
implicitly recognizes this limitation by the guidance it provides concerning the
auditor's response to a significant risk of misstatement. That guidance instructs the
auditor to exercise a heightened degree of professional skepticism by considering the
appropriateness of the experience and expertise of audit staff assigned to the audit; the
extensiveness of audit supervision that may be necessary; and the modification of the
nature, timing, and extent of auditing procedures to provide more persuasive evidence.
The auditor, however, still faces the perplexing problem of where to aim this added
audit intensity. Often the spectrum of financial statement components susceptible to
fraud induced misstatements is so broad that a massive portion of the financial state
ments must be subjected to utmost scrutiny. We believe that the additional time, cost,
and risk related to detecting specific misstatements when risk factors point to fraud
has caused an increased tendency for auditors to withdraw from audit engagements or
decline to accept clients where these factors are present. In these circumstances, audi
tors' concerns about management integrity and the need to rely on management
representations, particularly concerning the completeness assertion, requires switching
to a "fraud audit" audit strategy. Because such a strategy is extremely costly, the
auditor usually cannot contract to do the necessary work. Thus, the auditor withdraws
from the engagement. While these actions are not necessarily inappropriate, they do
emphasize the need for risk factors that are better able to target specific financial state
ment components.
Management Manipulation of Risk Factors: Fraud risk factors are subject to
management manipulation. Management is aware of the factors auditors consider in
assessing the risk of fraud−in many cases CFOs or other top executives have been
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auditors with CPA firms−and is able to distort or play down risk factors to mislead
auditors. A recent example of risk factor manipulation occurred in the Z Z Z Z Best Co.
where the C E O led auditors to address risk areas that really were not risky. This
directed auditors away from legitimate risk areas and helped perpetuate the conceal
ment of fraudulent financial reporting.
SAS No. 53 "Misstatement" Risk Factors: In addition to the limitations of fraud
risk factors discussed above, the manner in which SAS No. 53 guides the auditor's use
of risk factors creates other limitations. SAS No. 53 discusses risk factors as indica
tors of potential misstatements. Misstatements defined in the SAS include both errors
and irregularities, the latter being subdivided into management fraud and defalcations.
Because SAS No. 53 presents risk factors as signals of potential misstatements, the
auditor must decide whether a particular combination of risk factors indicates errors
(unintentional misstatements) or irregularities (intentional misstatements). If the
auditor concludes that irregularities are likely, then he or she must make an additional
judgment about whether they take the form of management fraud or defalcations.
The condition−error, management fraud, or defalcation−causing the misstatement
is significant. It affects how the auditor should respond to achieve reasonable assur
ance of detecting the misstatement. When the underlying cause of the misstatement is
intentional, as with management fraud and defalcations, the auditor's response should
consider that accounting principles and audit evidence may have been manipulated to
conceal or support the misstatement. When, on the other hand, the underlying cause is
unintentional, as with errors, the auditor generally has less concern about the credi
bility of audit evidence. In addition, the audit approach to respond to expected
management fraud is likely to differ from the approach to respond to expected defal
cations. Neither SAS No. 53 nor research on risk factors provides adequate guidance
about how such factors might indicate the underlying cause of misstatements.
SAS No. 53 does contain a brief discussion of management fraud. It requires a
specific assessment of the risk of management misrepresentation. This assessment is
in addition to and secondary to the requirement that the auditor assess the risk of
material misstatement. The S A S provides additional factors that an auditor may
consider that pertain specifically to this risk. Presumably, the auditor should incorpo
rate this secondary risk assessment-risk of management misrepresentation−into the
formation of the primary risk assessment-risk of material misstatements. However,
the SAS does not mention the interrelationship of the two risks, much less provide
guidance about integrating them.
The Risk Model, Reasonable Assurance, and Nature of Misstatements
SAS No. 53 requires the auditor to understand the characteristics of errors and
irregularities and their interaction when assessing the risk of misstatement. Those
characteristics-materiality, level of involvement, concealment, internal control struc
ture, and financial statement effect−(discussed in the Appendix to the SAS) are
discussed in the context of how they influence the auditor's ability to detect misstate
ments. The discussion states that the existence of some of these characteristics may
make some misstatements extremely difficult, if not impossible, to detect.
By introducing these characteristics into the auditor's risk assessment, SAS No. 53
raises the question as to whether the auditor is able to detect all misstatements, what
ever their characteristics, with the same level of assurance. We believe that the SAS
and a substantial majority of auditors take the position that all misstatements, what
ever their nature or characteristics, cannot be detected with the same level of
assurance.
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On the other hand, the auditor's standard report, prescribed in SAS No. 58, Reports
on Audited Financial Statements, requires a statement that the audit provides reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material
misstatements. Neither SAS No. 58 nor the standard report, differentiate among levels
of assurance for misstatements by nature or characteristics.
These two standards send different messages. We think that report readers believe
that the auditor is responsible for and can detect all misstatements, irrespective of
whether they are errors, management fraud, or defalcations, with the same level of
assurance, while auditors do not. In other words, auditors believe that what is a
"reasonable" level of assurance for detecting a misstatement varies with the nature of
the misstatement while report readers believe that this "reasonable" level of assurance
is the same for all misstatements. This certainly widens the expectation gap and, we
believe, should be specifically addressed in auditing standards.

Improving the Auditor's Fraud Detection Capability
In this section we present some suggestions for strengthening the auditor's ability
to detect fraud. These suggestions concern both changes in auditing standards and
changes in practice and, in varying degrees, involve practitioners, standard setters, and
academics in their implementation. Some of these suggestions are being considered
by the ASB's newly formed fraud task force.
Unambiguous Statement of Responsibility to Detect Fraud
We believe many auditors are still unsure or unaccepting of the responsibility for
detecting fraud that is set forth in SAS No. 53. On the historical timeline, as noted
earlier, the responsibility to detect fraud is new. Changing the old, entrenched belief
among auditors that they are not responsible for detecting fraud will require additional
effort. We believe one effective method would be to specifically use the term "fraud"
in auditing standards. Using the term irregularities and lumping it into misstatements
has obscured the auditor's understanding of the responsibility SAS No. 53 imposes.
We also believe that a restated responsibility should help the public to better understand the auditor's responsibility to detect fraud. The public needs to understand that
detecting all material fraud induced misstatements is beyond auditors' capability.
Auditors should have an affirmative responsibility to detect fraud, but it should be
articulated in a manner that clearly explains the concept of reasonable assurance and,
to the extent possible, sets forth that concept in an operational manner. We believe the
responsibility to detect fraud is analogous to the responsibility of police officers to
find criminals. It would be absurd for police officers to deny such a responsibility, but
it would be unreasonable to expect them to always find criminals. We believe that the
public understands and accepts this for police officers but not for auditors. Restating
the auditor's responsibility for fraud more precisely and coherently in professional
standards could help achieve this understanding and acceptance.
Refining the Audit Risk Model
Despite the limitations of the audit risk model discussed in the preceding section,
we do not advocate its abandonment. We believe that continued research and distillation of practice experience to attenuate the limitations are critical to enhancing the
auditor's ability to detect fraud.
The highest priority should be given to identifying factors that are relevant and reliable predictors of fraud. We hope that factors could be identified that correlate
specifically with fraud instead of fraud and error combined. In addition, we believe
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that fraud risk factors capable of reliably predicting the risk of fraud in specific financial statement components can and should be developed. Knowledge about such
factors would significantly improve the effectiveness of the risk model approach in
detecting fraud.
In addition to considering fraud risk factors for specific financial statement components, we believe that auditors should simply ask themselves which financial
statement component(s) would be a desirable area for executing fraud. This differs
from merely considering specific risk factors in that the auditor attempts to identify
the area where he or she would conceal a fraud if one were to be perpetrated. It has
the added benefit of not being directly related to risk factors and, therefore, not as
susceptible to the client's anticipation of where the auditor might focus additional
audit effort. In addition, it would help compensate for the client's knowledge of the
audit approach gained when firm staff accept positions with client entities.
Evidence About Fraud
In a number of circumstances involving fraudulent financial reporting, auditors had
ample evidence of fraud but failed to adequately recognize its implications or
follow-up on the questions that evidence raised. We believe that additional professional guidance is needed about audit evidence implications and evaluation.
One important area this guidance should address is evidence manipulation in fraud
schemes. Knowledge of the characteristics, indicators, and methods of distorting
manipulated evidence would sharpen the auditors' evaluation of audit evidence and
help to concentrate their attention on specific financial statement components where
fraud induced misstatements may exist. In addition, this knowledge would help in
developing audit procedures directed specifically toward determining whether
evidence has been manipulated.
We believe that two fruitful sources of information about manipulated evidence are
the SEC's Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases and litigated fraud cases.
Both of these sources have been used in identifying fraud risk indicators. They could
be used in a similar fashion to glean knowledge about evidence manipulation. In addition, the process recommended by the POB involving analyzing information in CPA
firm workpapers about alleged audit failures is another important source of information. Both practitioners and academics could contribute significantly to developing
this knowledge.
We also recommend that the profession create a formal process for collecting and
disseminating information from individual CPA firms about the audit techniques that
have been successful in detecting fraud. We believe that much useful information could
be captured by studying the profession's success stories in detecting fraud in the thousands of audits that do not end up on the front pages of the business and financial press.
Identifying and publishing how these frauds were devised, the techniques employed to
perpetrate them, and the evidence and auditing procedures that led to their detection
during the audit would enable the profession as a whole to gain from these experiences.
In addition, this process would better position the profession to answer its critics who
focus on the shortcomings of the audits that were not successful.
The recent K P M G Peat Marwick fraud survey ( K P M G Peat Marwick 1993), using
companies rather than C P A firms, is an example of how such a process might be
established. That survey provided information from companies about the frequency of
fraud, types of frauds, how they occurred, and how they were discovered, among
many other fraud attributes. Similar information from C P A firms would be a fertile
source of knowledge for the profession.
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Auditor Response to Risk Factors
When risk factors indicate a risk of fraud induced misstatements, auditors often
respond by strengthening the nature, timing, or extent of audit procedures. One
response is to apply analytical procedures to help target potential financial statement
components. Experience suggests that such procedures often are not effective because
management is able to respond with explanations that can be corroborated and yet
misleading.
Another common response to the risk of fraud is to strengthen tests of details. This
approach, however, has also been ineffective. Often, these tests fail because the
transactions or events used to perpetrate fraud occur late in the fiscal year. Auditors
have examined many such items already and found no problems. Thus, they are lulled
into complacency by past positive experience and fail to recognize the very items they
are looking for.
We believe S A S No. 53 should be revised or supplemented to provide more
specific guidance about appropriate audit testing responses and their application.
Audit Staffing
We also believe that changes in approaches to audit staffing might be beneficial in
improving the auditor's ability to detect fraud. The profession has developed and used
specialists for quite some time in individual industries. Today, there is increased
emphasis on training and using such specialists. We believe the notion of specializa
tion should be expanded. Public accounting firms should consider creating staff
specialization in certain financial statement areas. This specialization would pertain
not just to specific industries, but also to specific financial statement components,
such as valuation of certain assets or liabilities. Such specialities would provide exper
tise that would enhance the auditor's ability to detect fraud.
We believe such specialization would be helpful because today's audits are analo
gous to an assembly process where junior staff get experience in a particular audit
area, such as receivables and inventory, by participating in audits of those areas for
two or three clients. They then are assigned to other financial statement components in
other audits to gain experience in those areas. It is not uncommon for a staff person to
become a senior and have been exposed to a particular financial statement area only
once.
This process often does not provide sufficient exposure to audit areas to adequately
prepare junior staff to recognize circumstances that may involve fraud. Yet frequently
the work that is critical to detecting fraud is the basic auditing performed by these
staff members. A lack of depth of experience in specific audit areas may cause them to
overlook important matters relevant to fraud that, therefore, will not be brought to the
attention of more senior staff who could bring their greater expertise to bear on these
matters.
We recognize that this training approach may be impracticable to change, but we
believe that specialization in financial statement areas could help overcome some of
the disadvantages associated with this approach.

Summary
There is an old adage that a primary reason for studying history is to avoid repeating
it. The profession's history of defining the auditor's responsibility for detecting fraud
already contains too much repetition. A trend, however, is developing and there does
not seem to be room for a U turn−auditors are responsible for detecting fraud.
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This is a hefty responsibility and it must be defined in the context of the auditor's
capability to detect fraud. The profession has had mixed success in achieving a
reasonable blend of responsibility and capability. We believe that continued research
and practice experience to refine the audit risk model, better analysis of audits
involving fraud (successful as well as unsuccessful), a clearer definition and description of the auditor's responsibility to detect fraud, and changes in staff training and
specialization can help make responsibility commensurate with capability.
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